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In a previous experiment, we have shown that risk assessments of purchasing experts are certainly not better than that of subjects
untrained in purchasing, and worse than the decisions made by formal models (J. Purchas. Supply Manage. 9 (2003) 191–198). Since
both these results are rather counterintuitive, we conducted a series of experiments geared at replication and extension of these
ﬁndings. These new experiments show that our previous results are robust, and reveal an additional ﬁnding that is both worrying
and puzzling. It actually seems to be the case that for the purchasing decision tasks in our experiments, experts perform worse with
growing experience. It therefore seems that, at least for the kinds of purchasing decisions under study, it does not make much sense
to use expert judgments at all. However, we show that there is a way in which expert judgments can be used in combination with
formal models to improve the predictive accuracy of purchasing predictions. In our case, superior predictions are made when we
combine the prediction of a formal model with the prediction of the ‘average expert’, thereby combining the robust linear trends as
encapsulated in the formal model with the more intuitive conﬁgural rules used by experts. We provide several explanations for this
phenomenon.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Most people would agree that at least one of the tasks
of a purchase manager is to decide which of a set of
purchasing transactions needs purchase management
more. For instance, for some transactions it makes sense
to ask for many tenders, invest much in the screening of
suppliers, involve much time in negotiating, and put a
serious effort in writing a detailed contract. For other
transactions such investments are not effective or not
efﬁcient (Batenburg et al., 2000).
Although it is typically part of a purchase manager’s
job, there are compelling arguments on the basis of the
literature on clinical versus statistical prediction thate front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
rsup.2004.11.004
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ess: c.c.p.snijders@tm.tue.nl (C. Snijders).suggest that purchase managers—like all other hu-
mans—are typically not good at making precisely these
kinds of judgments. In a review study, Grove et al.
(2000) have shown that for single, quantitative decision
tasks computer models almost always perform at least
as good as or better than human experts. Most of the
studies they reviewed were based on tests in medical,
forensic and clinical-personality studies (102 out of 136).
There are only a handful of studies comparing human
experts with models that deals with ‘more economic
topics’. Grove et al. (2000, Table 1) mention studies on
business failure, job performance, job turnover, business
startup success, job success and work productivity. In a
previous publication (Snijders et al., 2003), we set out to
test this assertion when it comes to judgment and
decision-making in purchasing, and reported on an
alarming and somewhat counterintuitive result. It
indeed turned out that, for the cases under study,
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Table 1
Spearman correlations between actual and predicted scores, averaged




F. Tazelaar, C. Snijders / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 10 (2004) 211–222212purchasing professionals do not make better purchase
decisions than undergraduates, and both are actually
outperformed by a computer model (using a simple
formula).
Though in principle this result is in line with research
in other areas, and in that sense perhaps need not be
treated as a surprising ﬁnding, we want to analyze some
of the evident follow-up questions related to this result.
First, we consider how robust this ﬁnding is. Perhaps
our ﬁnding was simply for a purchasing professional
rather unlucky statistical ﬂuke, so we tried to replicate
our ﬁndings (and succeeded). Second, we extended our
previous research and considered possible reasons for
our ﬁndings by looking at the way in which experts, in
general, tend to behave. Finally, we focus on whether
and how the decision-making of purchasing profes-
sionals can be improved, based on the literature on
experts and expertise.1More careful and elaborate measurement and data analysis using
the dataset as mentioned in Buskens and Batenburg (2000) show that
other aspects than just these four also correlate with the amount and
likelihood of problems in a purchasing transaction (cf. Rooks, 2002).
That the model to predict problems as used in this paper is relatively
straightforward is in part a consequence of the fact that one only has
14 separate items available for prediction.2. Computer beats purchasing professionals: a robust
ﬁnding
We ﬁrst repeat in brief the essential elements of the
experimental setup as used in Snijders et al. (2003). In
that experiment, both purchase professionals and
undergraduates were each given 8 case descriptions
regarding a procurement transaction (the procurement
of IT-products; see Fig. 1 for an example case), and were
asked, among other things, to predict the likelihood of
this transaction being a problematic one (see Snijders
et al., 2003 for details). All our claims about the
judgment and decision-making capabilities of purchas-
ing professionals are, therefore, based on purchasing
professionals being able to identify which transactions
are the ones most likely to be problematic. This is,
obviously, not the only kind of decision a purchasing
manager has to make, but we think it is an important
one. Moreover, the purchasing professionals themselves
felt they would do ﬁne in this task, even when asked
after completion (but before displaying the results).
In fact, the vignettes were chosen from a larger
database of real purchasing transactions, so that we
actually knew the correct answers to what the purchas-
ing professional and the students were predicting and
could compare their answers with the real ones (for a
more detailed description of this database, see theAppendix A, and Batenburg, 1996 or Buskens and
Batenburg, 2000). In short, our professionals and
students were to predict how many problems would
occur, and we knew the right answer. All under-
graduates involved were freshmen in information
sciences and participated as part of a course require-
ment. Purchasing professionals participated in reaction
to an invitation from a student. Each pair of students
had to ﬁnd one purchasing professional who was willing
to participate. Preferably, the professional should have
experience in both purchasing and IT, since the
transactions on the vignettes were all about IT-products.
Ultimately, 30 purchasing professionals and 60 students
participated.
We made sure that for (almost) all sets of eight
vignettes, there were three individuals who made
predictions: a purchasing professional and two students.
The 240 (30 8) vignettes given to the purchasing
professional were all different. This guaranteed a large
spread in the kinds of vignettes under consideration and
it enabled a clean comparison of purchasing profes-
sionals versus students. Participants were also asked to
answer several other questions to which we will return
later.
Beforehand, we calculated a formula that generates
predictions on the likelihood of a particular transaction
being problematic (prediction 1) and which kinds of
problems were to be expected (prediction 2, for four
kinds of problems). No fancy modeling was used: for
both issues the formula was linear in the predictors. For
instance, the formula to predict the likelihood of
problems was a linear combination of the price of the
product (if high, then more problems), the importance
of the product for the proﬁt of the buyer (if high, then
more problems), the buyer’s ability to judge the price/
quality ratio of the product (if high, then more
problems), and the degree of detail in the written
contract (if high, then more problems). Note that this ,
roughly shows that the model simply expects more
problems for larger and more complicated transactions,
irrespective of the amount of effort involved in careful
planning and the kind of partner.1 We did not include
the kind and number of products as a predictor for the
model; this even gives a small information deﬁcit to the
model as compared to the respondent.
Hence, we used ﬁve formulas: one to predict how
problematic a transaction was going to be, and four
separate formulas, one for each speciﬁc problem that
could occur. Since we calculated the formulas on the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
The product 
It concerns the purchase of   <pc(s),cabling, tailor-made software> 
Price in Dutch guilders (Euros in later studies) < between 100,000 and 200,000 > 
Importance for the profit of the buyer firm < high > 
The supplier 
Size of the supplier (number of employees) < 400 > 
Reputation in the market < reasonable > 
The buyer 
Number of employees < 35 > 
Number of years in business with same supplier < 2 > 
Purchasing arranged through < purchasing department > 
Legal issues arranged through < external experts > 
Can judge price/quality for the different
possible suppliers < hardly > 
Know other clients of the same supplier < yes > 
Ex ante purchasing management 
Number of tender < 2 > 
Total investment in search, screening, selection,
Negotiating, and contracting < 4 mandays > 
Degree of detail of the written contract < high > 
On a scale from 0 to 100: 
How problematic do you think this transaction will turn out to be?  __________ 
where:     0  =    completely unproblematic 
100  =    highly problematic 
Which of the following problems do you expect to have a high probability of occurrence
for this transaction? (you may choose more than one) 
0    late delivery 
0    over price / budget 
0    incorrect specifications upon delivery 
0    inadequate documentation 
How certain are you about your answers? 
  “I am just                   “I am absolutely 
guessing”  1 2 3 4 5 6 7       certain” 
Fig. 1. Example vignette. Words between / S varied across vignettes.
2There are several other sensible ways to calculate measures
indicating how adequate the predictions of humans and the model
are. For instance, one could use a Pearson correlation instead of the
reported rank correlation, or focus on the absolute differences per case
instead of calculating a measured based on the set of eight vignettes.
Our ﬁndings are robust to such different ways of measurement.
F. Tazelaar, C. Snijders / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 10 (2004) 211–222 213basis of data that we had set aside for this purpose and
had not used in the experiment, this ensures standard
cross-validation of our formula.
In this setup, a comparison of both the answers as
calculated from the formula and the answers as
provided by the participants with the actual answers
enabled us to say something about whether computers
can outperform humans in predicting (the probability
of) problems associated with IT-transactions. The
comparison runs as follows. For each participant we
calculated the spearman rank correlation between the
predicted scores and the actual scores, across the eight
cases. A subject who ordered the vignettes perfectly
would get the maximum score of +1, whereas ordering
the transactions precisely the wrong way around yieldedthe minimum score of –1.2 We then compared the
average scores across the groups of participants: under-
graduates, purchasing professionals, and the formula.
Further details can be found in Appendix A and in
Snijders et al. (2003).
The results were that the purchasing professionals
performed worst, even a (non-signiﬁcant) bit worse than
undergraduates. Our formula outperformed both
groups (Snijders et al., 2003: p. 195).
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Table 2
Spearman correlations between actual and predicted scores, averaged per group, across experiments (higher is better)
Original I&L-1 I&L-2 MC Rep03
Formula 0.37 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.34
Non-professionals 0.26 — — — 0.14
Professionalsa 0.24 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.17
# participants 91 72 72 13 118
aFor I&L-1 and I&L-2 we grouped together all participants, even though not all of them label themselves as strictly a purchasing manager, since all
participants (with the exception of just one or two) have some professional relation to purchasing.
F. Tazelaar, C. Snijders / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 10 (2004) 211–222214To assess the robustness of this ﬁnding, we ran
(almost) the same experiment in several ways.
The I&L test: In March 2003, Paul van Haaster, the
editor of the Dutch ‘‘Tijdschrift voor Inkoop en
Logistiek’’ (I&L; ‘‘Journal of Purchasing and Logis-
tics’’), a management journal of the NEderlandse
Vereniging voor Inkoopmanagement (NEVI; Dutch
Association for Purchasing Management) called forth
to the readers to participate in our ‘‘I&L Purchasing
Test’’. Readers were informed that we believed that our
formula could outperform the readers with respect to
predicting the likelihood of problems, and were directed
to our website if they wanted to participate to see if we
were right (www.science2business.nl). On our website,
we basically asked the participants, most but not all of
them purchasing managers, to do the same test as
described above. Again each participant received eight
cases sampled from our database, for which they had to
predict the likelihood of the case being a problematic
one. After about 6 weeks, the ofﬁcial test was closed and
the results were reported in I&L (Snijders, 2003). We
label this experiment I&L-1. After the publication of the
results in I&L, people could still participate on the
website and, indeed, some more participants completed
the test since then. To discern these data from the
original test, we label these results I&L-2. Participants
were allowed to do the test more than once, and some
did. We report the results based on respondents’ ﬁrst
runs of eight cases only.
The masterclass: In January 2002, we gave the same
test to 13 participants of an International MasterClass
in Strategic Purchasing and Supply Management, at
Corsendonk, Belgium (MC). All participants, from
France, Belgium, The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, were professional experts in the ﬁeld of
purchasing.
Replication and extension: In November 2002, we
replicated our original experiment (including a few
extensions) in the same university course in which the
original experiment was conducted (Rep03). Next to
purchasing professionals and students ‘super laymen’
also were invited to participate in the experiment: people
who were speciﬁcally chosen not to have any speciﬁc
knowledge about purchasing, or about IT-products.The results of these experiments are reported in
Table 2.
In all experiments, the formula performs best. We
take this as rather strong support for our claim that, at
least in such a setting, a computerized prediction
outperforms humans, even if these humans are profes-
sionals in the ﬁeld of purchasing.
As we outlined earlier, although purchasing profes-
sionals—or even purchasing academics—might frown at
the credibility of these results, the results are actually not
that surprising in light of previous research in other
areas. Formulas are often found to predict at least as
good or better than experts (Meehl, 1954, 1986; Dawes,
1971, 1979; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Dawes et al., 1993; Grove
and Meehl, 1996; Grove et al., 2000; Snijders et al.,
2003). One likely reason for this, as often mentioned in
the literature, could be that humans in general are not
that good at tasks where sound decision-making
involves reliably storing, retrieving, and combining
information. But why is it that this also holds for
professionals (in purchasing)? One would expect that the
professionals have learned to overcome the problems
associated with making accurate predictions based on
their expertise and experience. We set out to better
understand why purchasing professionals are perform-
ing as they do. Part of the answer lies in the research on
expertise in general, from which we ﬁrst highlight some
important ﬁndings.3. Previous research on expertise: how experts are
different
For a relatively long period of time, the literature on
expertise has been surprisingly unspeciﬁc on what
constitutes an expert in a ﬁeld. In part, this might have
come about because research in cognitive psychology,
typically the academic discipline that is interested in the
area of expertise, studied ‘‘obvious experts’’. For
instance, expert decision-making has been studied quite
extensively in chess, where grandmasters constitute the
perfect example of an expert because a chess player’s
ELO-rating is an accurate measurement of a player’s
strength: ﬁnd a grandmaster based on ELO-rating (say,
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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expert decision-making progressed, and more and more
other academic disciplines became involved in this topic,
one has become a bit careless in what it means ‘‘to be an
expert’’. Usually, an expert is simply a person who is
experienced in making predictions in a given domain
and has some professional or social credentials (cf.
Camerer and Johnson, 1991: p. 196). Usually, the
minimum condition to label someone an expert is the
possession of some speciﬁc human capital; both training
and experience in a speciﬁc domain of expertise. The
problem is that if we are looking for professional experts
in purchasing, or extraordinary experts in management,
we have no clear and objective measurements and must
rely on cues other than measurable external validity.
This is nicely illustrated in Shanteau (1987) and
Shanteau and Peters (1989). Shanteau proposes a set
of characteristics that determines whether and to what
extent someone must be considered an expert, divided in
knowledge and cognition, personality traits, and pre-
sentation and image (see Table 3).
As can be seen from Shanteau’s list, to a substantial
extent the cues that are used are not necessarily related
to being objectively able to perform better than non-
experts. For instance, self-conﬁdence need not be related
to true expertise at all, just like communication skills.Table 3




Experts have an extensive knowledge base a
developments
Creativity The ability to provide novel or even unique
approaches to established problems as nece
Perceptive The ability to extract information from a p
enhanced by insightful recognition and eval
Knowing what is
relevant
On the basis of experience, experts can read
utilize only what is relevant; the ignore wha
Simpliﬁcation Expert know how to use a divide-and-conqu
understanding.
Identifying exceptions Experts know when to follow established dec
problems.
Personality
Self-conﬁdence Experts have a strong belief in their ability
decisions.
Adaptability Experts adjust their decision-making strateg
conditions of the on-going problem.
Experience Experts use past experience to make decisio
produces decisions without obvious effort.
Stress Tolerance Experts are able to make decisions under hi




Experts can convince others that they have s
make decisions to others.
Problem Selectivity Experts use foresight and planning in select
problems that they can effectively handle or
Assumes Responsibility Experts accept responsibility for the outcom
behind their decisions.Likewise, being able to quickly and seemingly effort-
lessly make decisions does not guarantee that these
decisions are accurate. In fact, the list is closer to a list of
necessary conditions. If you really are an expert, then
you are likely to score high on this list. Whether the
reverse also holds, is not obvious, and often not true
(Camerer and Johnson, 1991). In the tradition of
the ﬁeld, the list largely represents process character-
istics of experts: ways in which the experts deal with
information.
A similar set of expert characteristics is given in
Glaser and Chi (1988). In a review, they conclude that
experts differ from non-experts in the following ways
(Table 4):
For the larger part, Glaser and Chi’s conclusions are
based on research in ‘‘beta-oriented’’ areas, such as
physics (and chess), so it remains to be seen to what
extent these conclusions carry over to purchasing.
Nevertheless, it does show that documented differences
between experts and others exist. It is useful to
emphasize this, to preclude that one would misinterpret
the message of this paper as ‘‘experts know and can do
nothing’’. This is certainly not what we are claiming.
What is noteworthy though, is that again a large share
of the characteristics relate to the way in which experts
process information and (can) make decisions: they seend make a serious effort to keep up with the current facts, trends, and
solutions to difﬁcult problems. They are capable of generating new
ssary.
roblem that others cannot see. Experts’ decision-making ability is
uation of confusing situations.
ily distinguish relevant from irrelevant information in a problem. They
t is not.
er approach with complex problems. They work on parts to get a better
ision strategies and when not to. They don’t have just one way to solve
to make good decisions. They are calm and self-assured while making
ies to ﬁt the current situation. They are responsive to changes in
ns more-or-less automatically. Their background and experience
gh stress situations. They continue to be effective problem solvers even
of high levels of pressure.
pecialized knowledge. They can effectively communicate their ability to
ing which problems to work on and which not. They tackle those
solve.




1. Experts excel only in their own domain (expertise is narrow)
2. Experts consider larger coherent pieces (‘‘chunks’’) of information
3. Experts are quicker
4. Experts have a better memory (in their own domain)
5. Experts understand the underlying problem at a deeper level
6. Experts spend a relatively large part of their time analyzing a
problem qualitatively (‘‘what should roughly be the outcome?’’, ‘‘to
which category of problems does this problem belong?’’)
Source: Glaser and Chi (1988).
Table 5
Median importance of the different case characteristics in predicting
how problematic a case will be, according to the participants. Data
pooled across experiments, distinguishing between purchasing profes-





Kind and number of products 10 9
Price 5 5




Size of the supplier (number of
employees)
5 4
Reputation in the market 6 10
The buyer
Number of employees 1 3
Number of years in business with same
supplier
5 9
Way in which purchasing is arranged 5 5
Way in which legal issues are arranged 4 5
Can judge price/quality for the different
possible suppliers
10 7
Know other clients of the same supplier 2 5
Ex ante purchasing management
Number of tenders 7 5
Total investment in search, screening,
selection, negotiating, and contracting
6 7
Degree of detail of the written contract 10 10
F. Tazelaar, C. Snijders / Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management 10 (2004) 211–222216and consider larger chunks of information, they are
faster, decide on the basis of a better memory, and so
on. This suggests that experts are better equipped to
make decisions. Naturally, a better memory and higher
speed are assets, but they do not necessarily imply that
those who possess these qualities actually make better
decisions. The process-performance paradox (Camerer
and Johnson, 1991) is that in many ﬁelds ‘experts’
can often indeed be shown to behave and decide
differently, but often not with better objective results.
It certainly seems that our purchasing professionals ﬁt
this description: they do not perform better than non-
experts. Let us ﬁnd out if there are differences in the way
in which the experts make their decisions in our
experiment.4. Purchasing professionals versus laymen
In all experiments we asked the participants after the
completion of the cases if they could divide 100 points
over the 14 different case characteristics. They should
give more points to characteristics they considered
‘‘more important to predict the degree of problems’’.
For instance, if a participant thought that price is the
only thing that matters to predict the degree of
problems, this participant should give all 100 points to
the aspect ‘‘price’’. Or, if a participant thought that
mainly the degree of detail in the written contract
matters, together with the reputation of the supplier,
then ‘‘degree of detail’’ could get, say, 70 points, and
‘‘reputation’’ 30 points. Table 5 reports the median
scores per case characteristic, distinguishing between
purchasing professionals and others (we chose medians
instead of means because these are less sensitive to
outliers).
There is certainly some agreement here: both purchas-
ing professionals and others feel that the degree of detail
of the written contract, and the kind and number of the
products, are important. Many other case characteristics
are deemed equally important by both groups of
participants. There are also some differences. Profes-
sionals feel reputation is less important, whereas thenon-professionals think it is one of the most important
aspects. Instead, professionals attach predictive value to
whether the buyer can judge price/quality, about which
the non-professionals do not feel that strong.
Interestingly, there is some evidence that the profes-
sionals are indeed ‘‘chunkier’’ in their way of dealing
with this division of points. For instance, the profes-
sionals show a larger standard deviation in their way of
dividing points (note this cannot be inferred from Table
5). Their standard deviation across the fourteen
characteristics is 7.4 whereas it is 6.4 for the non-
professionals. Moreover, if we count the number of
characteristics to which professionals give points at all,
then the average number is 10.0 for the professionals
and 11.2 for the non-professionals. We now look at the
way of dividing the points in some more detail.
For one experiment, IL-1, we were able to distinguish
three characteristics on which the professionals typically
differ. The ﬁrst one is whether the professional is a
person for whom purchasing is their core business versus
the ones for whom it is not (core business). The second
characteristic distinguishes purchasing professionals
with a lot of experience versus those with only a brief
history in purchasing (experience). The third character-
istic differentiates between purchasing professionals
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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heads of departments, heads of purchasing) versus those
with jobs that are more at the operational level (level).
Comparing the test performance of each of the
distinguished categories results in some noteworthy
ﬁndings. First, purchasing professionals for whom
purchasing is their core business hardly perform better
(Spearman correlations of 0.20 versus 0.13, n.s.,
p40:20). Second, purchasing professionals with a lot
of experience in purchasing are not better than
purchasing professionals with only a brief history in
purchasing. On the contrary, experienced purchasing
professionals perform (signiﬁcantly) worse. This ﬁnding
is even more remarkable, given the fact that the
experienced professionals have more trust in their own
abilities to perform well on such a test: the more years in
purchasing, the more purchasing managers claim that
they can judge the likelihood of problems in purchasing
transactions on the basis of circa ten transaction
characteristics (Fig. 2).
Third, purchasing professionals with a relatively
‘‘high-level job’’ do not perform any better in judging
the likelihood of problems in purchasing transactions
than purchasing professionals with jobs that are more at
the operational level. On the contrary, it turns out that
senior purchasers, heads of departments, and purchas-
ing directors perform (signiﬁcantly) worse. They score
an average Spearman correlation of 0.01—which implies
that their decisions cannot be distinguished from
ﬂipping a coin—versus 0.29 for the juniors.
These results put a special spotlight on those (older,
more experienced, senior) managers that ﬁrmly rely on
their experience in purchasing. In this type of task they
are strikingly outperformed by their young professional
colleagues. Moreover, in the I&L-1 experiment we ﬁnd
that managers that rely on their ﬁrst impressions and on
their gut feeling perform less well than those who are
more reluctant to do that.
The research ﬁnding experienced that experts do not
perform better in professional judgments, predictions
and decisions than those with less experience, does not
only hold in purchasing alone. There are a large numberFig. 2. Conﬁdence in the accuracy of judgments (left) and score on theof domains for which the literature has shown similar
results. Based on a meta-analysis of 55 research projects
on judging the performance of professionals in the ﬁeld
of psychology and psychiatry, Garb (1989, 1998) comes
to the conclusion that experienced professional psychol-
ogists may perform somewhat better than super lay
persons, such as freshmen students or secretaries, but
that their performance is hardly ever better than that of
graduate students who received only a moderate level of
training. In general, a little bit of training helps, but
gaining a lot of experience after that initial stage hardly
ever does. Similar conclusions have been reached in the
ﬁeld of medicare (Gustafson, 1963; Kundel and LaFoll-
ette, 1972; Shortliffe et al., 1979), as well as in many
other domains of expertise (Camerer and Johnson,
1991). Characteristic for the ﬁeld of purchasing is that
we reach even sharper conclusions: in making profes-
sional judgments many experienced professional experts
perform extremely poorly. How can these ﬁndings be
explained? Again, we search for answers in the literature
on expertise.
One feature that is characteristic for the ﬁeld of
purchasing management, and for many other ﬁelds of
professional expertise, is the lack of frequent and direct
feedback. Without systematic feedback it is hard, and
sometimes even impossible to learn from one’s own
mistakes and misjudgments, no matter how experienced
one is. Moreover, following Camerer and Johnson
(1991), characteristic for experienced professional ex-
perts in such a context without immediate and accurate
feedback is that, compared to lay persons, novices and
young professionalstesexperts are more selective in their search for informa-
tion, experts store information much faster,
 experts have a more active pattern of contingent
search: Subsets of variables are considered in each
case, in different sequences, experts use less information, and the information used
is more combined in a non-linear way; they often use
conﬁgural choice rules,t (right) by years in purchasing (best ﬁt cubic regression line).
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knowledge base of prototype cases; their choices are
often characterized by an over-generalization of
speciﬁc prototype examples, experts use more ‘‘broken-leg cues’’ (I.e., cues of the
kind that, if encountered, ensure that the expert
immediately knows—or thinks to know—that other
cues are now irrelevant. For instance, to predict if I
will run the marathon tomorrow, a ‘‘broken-leg cue’’
would be that I have a broken leg.).
This type of decision-making may be adequate in
highly speciﬁc contexts, for instance in turbulent market
situations and situations that are characterized by
abrupt change, but in many other contexts this type of
information processing will be less proﬁtable. Decision-
making in purchasing is too ‘‘noisy’’ for professionals to
acquire expertise and use the abovementioned decision
strategies with success. Generally, decisions in purchas-
ing are made in a context where feedback is lacking,
where it is not really clear which case characteristics are
good predictors, where measurement of what could be
the relevant case characteristics is often lacking, and
where the outcome is not strictly deterministic but
probabilistic instead. In such a setting, it is not that
surprising that cold, calculating formulas do a better
job.
It may seem as if the judgments by purchasing
professionals are altogether useless when compared to
a reasonably selected formula. As we will show, this is
not the case. When carefully employed, the profes-
sional’s judgments can be used to improve purchasing
decisions.5. Improving experts
Another way to understand the behavior of profes-
sionals in purchasing, better, is by trying to ﬁnd out how
to improve upon their scores. There are several ways of
doing this (Kleinmuntz, 1990), but at the heart of most
of these lie two ideas. The ﬁrst one is the idea that
experts, just like humans in general, are ‘‘too volatile’’ in
their judgments. This can be understood as follows. The
formula, which is a linear prediction, provides an
appropriate ‘‘average judgment’’ across cases. Even if
the formula performs very well, you can be sure that if
you judge like the formula, you will certainly make
mistakes in many instances: ﬁtting a straight line
through a cloud of dots means missing most of the
dots, even if the line is on average close to many of them.
Humans are reluctant to judge in what they feel is a ‘‘too
rigid’’ way, because they strive (too hard for their own
good) to give the proper judgment each and every time.
Unfortunately, this makes them perform worse on
average in the long run (cf. Kleinmuntz, 1990; Camererand Johnson, 1991). This is the basis of the ﬁrst way to
try to improve human experts. On can try to somehow
partial out the excessive variance of human experts. The
second idea is that, although experts generally deviate
from linear predictions in too strong a manner, there
could be some merit in combining the judgments of a
model with those from experts to get a model-plus-
expert prediction that outperforms both the model and
the experts. This might work because in this combina-
tion the model takes care of an overall linear ﬁt that is
reasonable, whereas the experts’ intuition could capture
the deviations from the linear model (Blattberg and
Hoch, 1990; Goodwin, 2002; Morris, 1986). Of course,
whether these ideas, reducing variance and combining
model and expert work here, is an open question. In
other ﬁelds, such variants have shown to be a useful
improvement (e.g., Ashton and Ashton, 1985; Clemen,
1986; Edwards, 1962; Einhorn, 1972; Makridakis and
Winkler, 1983; Showers and Chakrin, 1981). We now try
several combinations of these ideas to test if they
improve expert forecasting.
5.1. Creating an ‘expert system’ by averaging across
experts
One way to try to improve upon the predictions of
experts through reducing variance, is by using the
estimates of the whole group of experts to calculate
the ‘average expert estimate’ as dependent on the
characteristics of the cases, and then using this ‘average
expert model’ to predict the likelihood of problems in
the different cases (Camerer, 1981; Hill, 1982; Hogarth,
1978). This represents on a small scale how one could
conceive of creating a knowledge base by combining
expert judgments. In a way, this expert model can be
seen as the combined knowledge of all participating
experts. Across all ﬁve experiments, this procedure leads
to a model with a Spearman coefﬁcient of 0.23, only a
small and borderline statistically signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0:08;
one-sided) improvement over using the estimates of the
separate experts. Nevertheless, the formula still outper-
forms the expert system, with a score of 0.32.
5.2. Creating an ‘expert system’ by averaging within
experts across cases
A comparable expert model can be made in a slightly
different way. For each expert, we try to calculate a
model based on his or her estimates on the eight cases.
Obviously, given only eight cases per expert, it makes no
sense to try to estimate a model using 14 different
variables (which is the number of case characteristics we
have). We, therefore, restrict ourselves to three of the
stronger predictors of eventual problems: the volume of
the transaction, the duration of the past relationship,
and the ability to judge the relation between price and
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Table 6
Spearman correlations between predictions on the degree of problems and the actual degree for different models using the expert judgments (higher is
better). Results are averaged across the ﬁve experiments and for purchasing professionals only
Experts Formula Expert system 1 Expert system 2 Formula+experts Formula+exp. system 1
0.19 0.32 0.23 0.19 0.27 0.36
3Again, one could argue that the Spearman (rank) correlation is an
unnecessary simpliﬁcation here, since the prediction criterion has an
interval scale. The results reported do not depend on whether one uses
rank correlation or Pearson correlation.
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ﬁt for each expert, and subsequently use this model’s
predictions instead of the expert’s own predictions, we
end up with a Spearman correlation of 0.19. This is
equally accurate as the experts’ own predictions were. In
other words, an ‘average expert model’ with weights on
only three (aptly chosen) variables performs just as well
(or just as bad, if you prefer) as the expert. The
formula’s score, 0.32, is still out of reach. The latter
comparison is not really fair, because the formula uses
more than these three variables. If we conﬁne the
formula to the same three variables, it’s score is 0.25,
still better than the expert.
5.3. Combining experts’ judgments with the formula
Next, we try the second possible improvement, by
blending the formula’s predictions with the predictions
of experts. In accordance with Blattberg and Hoch
(1990) we ﬁrst calculate a new set of predictions for each
case, by taking the average of the formula’s prediction
and the prediction of the expert. Now the Spearman
correlation increases to 0.27, a substantial improvement
over the experts’ own judgments, but still lower than the
formula’s 0.32. There is, however, an interesting ﬁnding
here. If we use weights other than 50% model and 50%
expert, it is indeed possible to get an improvement that
even outperforms, though only slightly, the formula. A
weighting of about 90% model with 10% expert yields a
Spearman correlation of 0.35. This is not a fair
comparison, since the 90–10 division was found in a
completely ‘data-driven’ way. Nevertheless, it does show
that it may be possible to use the experts’ judgments to
improve upon the formula per se. This promising ﬁnding
leads us to try a different and less data-driven way of
combining formula and expert.
5.4. Combining an ‘expert system’ with the formula
Since the optimal weighting when using a combina-
tion of the formula and the expert judgments was 90–10,
perhaps the expert judgments by themselves are still too
volatile. But what if we combine the formula with the
‘expert system’ mentioned in Section 5.1. It is con-
ceivable that in this way we can get the best of both
worlds. The volatility in expert judgments is decreased,
while maintaining enough of the expert intuition thatcaused the favorable results in the previous attempt.
Thus, we ﬁrst calculate—as we did above—a formula
that represents the ‘average expert’ by regressing the
experts’ judgments on the case characteristics. Then, we
combine this average expert judgment with the formula,
with equal weights for both. It turns out that this indeed
gives even better performance: the Spearman correlation
now equals 0.36, a small but statistically signiﬁcant
increase (p ¼ 0:024; onesided) that is stable across the
ﬁve different experiments.
A summary of the results is presented in Table 6.3
Note that the original formula performs best, except
for one alternative model, i.e. the formula combined
with the expert system, the last of the abovementioned
alternative models. The difference is hardly substantial,
but at least we do ﬁnd some evidence here that the
decisions of experts can be incorporated in the overall
prediction to some effect.6. Conclusion and discussion
The ﬁnding that a formula predicts the prevalence of
problems better than purchasing professionals has been
shown to be a robust ﬁnding across different experi-
ments. Our analyses and review of part of the relevant
literature also give some feel for the causes underlying
the relatively poor performance of professionals. Ex-
perts process a judgment task differently than do non-
professionals, tend to relate their judgments to selec-
tively available cases, and use larger chunks of
information at the same time. Even though they do
often not outperform less experienced colleagues, they
are generally more certain about the accuracy of their
outcomes. When looking closer at the data, we even ﬁnd
some evidence that over the course of their career and
with increasing experience, purchasing professionals
develop habits that hamper rather than facilitate
providing accurate predictions. An accurate overall
prediction typically involves consistently weighing the
available case characteristics, and professionals are less
inclined to do that as their experience progresses.
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cannot but conclude that the judgments of purchasing
professionals are superﬂuous altogether. And undeni-
ably, most potential improvements of the judgments of
professionals do not lead to judgments that outperform
the cross-validated formula. However, we do ﬁnd
evidence that a sensible combination of both the
formula and the expert judgments may improve upon
the professional and may even outperform the formula.
This involves ﬁrst combining the expert judgments into
an ‘average expert’, and then combining this with the
formula.
Taken together, our analyses show that purchasing
professionals are not an exception to the general rule in
the scientiﬁc literature that computer models outper-
form professionals when it comes to the kind of clear cut
decision tasks as described here. Though this may seem
to paint a bleak picture of the abilities of purchasing
professionals, one should not stretch our ﬁndings
beyond their limits. Let us ﬁrst stress that we are not
claiming that—in general—computer models are better
purchasing professionals. There is much more to being a
purchasing professional than just making single shot
decisions of the kind we discussed, and certainly many
of the challenges purchasing professionals have to deal
with are beyond the realm of a computer model. Our
conclusions are conﬁned to tasks of the kind as in our
experiment. These are tasks where the decision is clear-
cut (e.g., Should I use tenders and how many?), and
where there is at least some data on past performance
available for a model to be constructed. We discuss
some of these issues in the section on practical
implications below. Several factors typically make such
decision tasks more difﬁcult for purchasing profes-
sionals as opposed to computer models: they work in an
environment where immediate and precise feedback is
generally lacking, and where many factors inﬂuence the
eventual outcome so that the optimality of their own
behavior cannot be clearly distinguished.
Several counterarguments to our results can be
thought of. First of all, in our experiment the profes-
sionals are forced to make their decisions in a context
that is certainly more abstract than they are used to.
Although our results still hold if we only use the data of
the professionals who claimed to be certain about their
answers, it is possible that their judgments would
improve and perhaps surpass the judgments of the
model with increasing information about the transac-
tion. We aim to test this in a future experiment. A
second counterargument we can think of is that in our
experiment there are no real incentives to make the right
decisions. Purchasing professionals are used to decide in
situations with a lot of money at stake, and are perhaps
less inclined to think carefully when all there is to gain is
a high test score. It is difﬁcult to argue against this given
available data. Closer inspection of the cases whereprofessionals took the test more than once shows that
their results do not tend to improve on second runs. This
could perhaps be interpreted as a sign that extra
attention does not help much, but we admit that this
is not very compelling. Again, this is something to take
into account in a future experiment.7. Implications for practitioners
Our ﬁndings corroborate the idea that it would be
wise to at least take a closer look at many of the
decisions and predictions in purchasing, or even
management decisions in general. There is a deﬁnite
gain in using decision support of a speciﬁc kind: devising
a formula that systematically combines relevant inputs.
A simple formula will often outperform the purchasing
expert’s intuition and experience. As we have experi-
enced ﬁrst hand, many purchasing professionals are
surprised about the improvements in accuracy that can
be accomplished by letting a formula decide, especially
for the decisions that they feel are typically their area of
expertise. In particular, one should focus on decisions
and predictions where, in practice, immediate feedback
of the correctness of decisions is lacking or imprecise. In
these cases, it is difﬁcult, if not impossible for profes-
sionals to learn from experience, and professionals will
have a hard time building up expertise, even though they
may feel otherwise, and even though others may judge
them as experts. Typically, for many situations in
purchasing and managerial decision-making, one can
never know what would have happened in case a
different decision had been made. This implies that in
fact most of the predictions and decisions in purchasing
and management lack this immediate and adequate
feedback that is necessary to build up expertise, and are
a serious candidate for computerized decision-making.
Of course, when data on which to base a prediction or
decision are not available, one can only use judgments
by professionals. Note, however, that in these cases it is
generally possible to improve upon the separate expert
judgments by aggregation of expert judgments to reduce
excessive variance. What remains throughout all our
experiments and others in the literature, is that a major
improvement in purchasing decisions can be made if at
least some (representative) data that are relevant to the
decision are available (and used for prediction). A rather
straightforward formula based on data from past cases
soon outperforms professional judgment.
The kinds of decisions for which one could, or
perhaps should, consider making use of formulas
instead of professional judgment are typically decisions
that occur rather frequently (otherwise it is less feasible
to gather the data from previous cases). For instance, we
feel an improvement could be made for questions such
as the choice for the optimal number of tenders, the
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purchasing transaction, which of a set of purchasing
transactions to invest more time in, and so on. Decisions
that are ‘one of a kind’ (Should we follow through with
this merger? Should we become an organization that
operates internationally?) are less suitable for such an
approach, though principally one could conceive of
formula’s being devised on a large set of these kinds of
decisions from other organizations. For those willing to
invest an extra effort in improving decision-making even
more, combining the formula with an ‘agent formula’
that mimics the average behavior of experts, there is a
(relatively small) extra gain in accuracy.
A ﬁnal implication relates to the education and
training of professionals. We feel that the ﬁrst step to
improvement is awareness of the problem. To start with,
it would therefore make sense that the education and
training of purchasing professionals at least includes the
message that the judgments and decisions of purchasing
professionals are not as good as they can be, and can be
improved upon by using computer models. In practice
this will be hard to get across, let alone implement. This
is because this message hits professionals in an area in
which they consider themselves the experts, which
makes it difﬁcult to accept. Moreover, the reasons for
the relative inferiority in judgments are so ingrained in
humans that they are hard to overcome. Given our
result that experience does not improve judgments, we
think the most progress can be made by educating
young professionals to be ﬂexible and open-minded
about using computer models to their advantage.Acknowledgements
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(KNAW).Appendix A. Vignette construction and measurement
The vignettes were taken from our database of
Purchasing Transactions of the External Management
of Automation, a large scale survey on the purchase of
IT-products by Dutch SMEs (5–200 employees). The
sampling frame was a business-to-business database of
Dutch SMEs that contained information about the
characteristics of these SMEs with respect to automa-
tion. The database can be considered to be representa-
tive for the Dutch population of SMEs (see Batenburg,
1997). Care was taken to achieve high response rates:
ﬁrms were contacted by phone and if a respondent
agreed to ﬁll out a survey on a speciﬁc purchasing
transaction, ﬁeld workers delivered the survey on the
agreed upon date and were instructed to leave with theﬁlled out survey. If the respondent was willing to ﬁll out
a second survey on a different purchasing transaction,
the ﬁeld worker was to leave a questionnaire and a
response envelope so that the respondent could ﬁll out
this second case at his or her convenience. Eventually,
the average response rate to the telephone interview was
67% (902 out of 1,335). Multiplied with the ﬁeld
response rate of 87% (788 out of 902), the total response
rate equaled 59% (788 out of 1,335). This is a high
response rate in comparison with other surveys among
organizations (cf. Kalleberg et al., 1996: chaps. 1–2).
Non-response analysis showed that the response group
is not biased on crucial ﬁrm characteristics such as size,
industry or region. The codebook, which includes the
questionnaires, is downloadable from http://www.fss.
uu.nl/soc/iscore.
Per transaction, over 300 issues were measured,
including the ones mentioned in the vignettes, such as
the number of tenders, the number of days involved in
negotiating and contracting, etc. The problems asso-
ciated with the transactions were measured by having
respondents check on a 5-point scale the (degree of)
problems that had occurred. Based on results in the pilot
phase the respondents could choose from ‘‘late deliv-
ery’’, ‘‘over budget’’, ‘‘product incomplete’’, ‘‘product
too slow or too conﬁned’’, ‘‘speciﬁcation not as agreed’’,
‘‘incompatible with other systems’’, ‘‘sloppy installa-
tion’’, ‘‘after-sales slow or missing’’, ‘‘service slow or
missing’’, ‘‘necessary adjustments slow or missing’’, and
‘‘insufﬁcient documentation’’. Our empirical analysis
turned out that there is a single dimension underly-
ing these problems—a principal component analysis
yielded a clear single component. Our data show
that, on average, a large number of problems and a
high degree of problems go together. The degree of
‘‘problematicness’’ is therefore measured as the average
score on this list of problems. We then classiﬁed all
cases according to their score into eight categories of
similar size, ranging from 1 ¼ not very problematic to
8 ¼ very problematic. Each individual received one
(randomly chosen) vignette from each category, in a
random order.References
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